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THE IMPACTS OF THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR DISASTER ON 
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION:  
AN EXAMINATION OF TEPCO’S DAILY LOAD CURVE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster on Tokyo 
Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) electricity load using alternative event study 
methodology. The data set includes TEPCO’s published hourly loads from January 1, 
2008 to December 31, 2011. Four time series regressions are used to analyze the 
disaster’s effect on TEPCO’s load curve at an hourly and aggregate level. By examining 
the hourly impacts of the disaster, this paper provides commentary on the effects of the 
disaster on the daily load curve. The models control for temperature, population, time of 
day, week, month, and year, holidays, and trends. The results indicate a significant, 
negative relationship between the disaster and TEPCO’s electricity load. In addition to 
examining the effects of the disaster on the daily load curve, four event windows are 
analyzed, ranging from a week after the March 11, 2011 disaster to the end of the data set 
(December 31, 2011). These event windows are used to capture the short, medium, and 
long-term effects of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster on electricity load. These event 
window results combined with an analysis of the annual and disaster trend variables 
allow for commentary on the timeline for which TEPCO’s loads will reach pre-disaster 
levels. Additionally, the results provide insight into both the economic and political 
implications of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster both in Japan and worldwide.    
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Introduction:  
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster occurred on March 11, 2011 following 
the Tohoku earthquake and ensuing tsunami. The Tohoku earthquake was the most 
powerful earthquake ever recorded in Japan and its effects combined with the consequent 
nuclear disaster have significantly impacted the Japanese people as they have faced 
relocation, potential health risks due to radiation exposure, and the loss of friends and 
family. The economic consequences have been considerable, resulting in a 2.1 percent 
decrease in national GDP in the second quarter of 2011 compared to the same period in 
the previous year. Additionally, industrial production and exports dropped by seven and 
eight percent, respectively, with the most severe losses in the automobile, electronic 
equipment, and metal industries.1 On a global level, the disaster has disrupted both the 
energy market and the supply chain for many manufactured goods. In terms of the energy 
market, the disaster has affected both the countries that are currently reliant on nuclear 
energy and the emerging markets that are in the process of constructing nuclear power 
plants. The Fukushima Daiichi disaster has raised questions and insecurities regarding the 
future use of nuclear energy both in Japan and worldwide.  
 This paper focuses solely on the nuclear disaster’s effect on the service area of the 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), owner of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
plant, and the direct impact of the accident on the region. The goal of this paper is to 
identify the magnitude of the disaster’s effect on TEPCO’s load curve at an hourly and 
aggregate level. Specifically, I investigate how the daily load shape has changed and 
                                                        
1
 Masahisa Fujita and Nobuaki Hamaguchi, “Japan and Economic Integration in East Asia: Post-Disaster 
Scenario,” Annals of Regional Science 48 (2012): 493, ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed April 
2012.  
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connect these changes to Japanese consumer response to the nuclear disaster by 
identifying which hours experienced the most significant changes post-Fukushima 
Daiichi. In addition, I determine whether these changes are short-term and slowly 
reverting back to demand preferences similar to those before the nuclear crisis, or if these 
changes are going to have long term impacts due to more permanent shifts to alternative 
energy sources such as combustion gas turbines and renewable energy.  
 I predict that aggregate and hourly examinations of post-Fukushima Daiichi loads 
will demonstrate that the disaster significantly impacted the daily load curve in a negative 
way, and that loads are slowly shifting back to levels seen before the nuclear disaster. I 
predict that business hours (hours 7 to 17) will see the most significant load changes after 
the disaster because they are the most active time of the day for Japanese consumers and, 
therefore, saving efforts will be the most evident during these hours. In order to test these 
hypotheses I run a statistical analysis of TEPCO’s hourly loads from January 1, 2008 to 
December 31, 2011, using interactive dummy variables and trend variables to capture the 
significance of the disaster on hourly electricity consumption and overall load 
movements. 
An alternative event study approach is used to set up four regressions followed by 
hourly load comparisons. The first two include a single disaster dummy variable with 
TEPCO’s hourly loads as the dependent variable in the first and the log of TEPCO’s 
hourly loads as the dependent variable in the second. The other two have the same 
dependent variables as the first two, but include interactive hourly disaster variables that 
capture the hourly impact of the disaster on the loads. After the data is regressed, t-tests 
are performed, comparing the hourly variables to the interactive hourly disaster variables 
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and testing for significance. The first two regressions yielded significant disaster 
variables at the one percent level, positive post-disaster trends, and negative annual 
trends. The third and fourth regressions yielded significant hourly and interactive hourly 
disaster variables at the one percent level, with the most extreme significance occurring 
during the on-peak hours, especially during periods of transition (hours seven to nine and 
seventeen to nineteen). Additionally, these regressions yielded similar trends to those in 
models one and two.  
 This event study provides an in-depth look into both consumer and government 
reactions to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and provides insight into the future of 
the electricity industry in Tokyo. The significance of these disaster and trend variables 
sheds light onto the longevity of consumer saving measures as well as the recovery pace 
of electricity loads to pre-disaster levels. This paper provides commentary regarding the 
success of policy measures, specifically the fifteen percent government mandated 
decrease in demand, that have been in place since the disaster. Additionally, the paper 
comments on the further success of consumers in decreasing demand beyond what is 
required of them. If these changes in electricity consumption become more permanent, as 
this paper suggests, future policies and utility structures will be forced to adapt, possibly 
resulting in market liberalization, higher prices, or grid transformation. Regardless of the 
result, the changes in electricity demand analyzed here will force consumers, regulators, 
and the Japanese government to reconsider not only the future of nuclear energy but also 
the structure of the energy industry as a whole.  This paper also comments on the 
disaster’s effect on Japan as a whole due to electricity’s influence in all sectors of the 
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economy. Consequently, the results produced here will indicate movements in both 
consumer sentiment and overall economic recovery.  
Institutional Background: 
The daily load curve depicts the demand for electricity throughout a 24-hour day 
and provides a detailed look into consumer preferences. The demand for electricity 
fluctuates more sharply in Japan than it does in other countries such as the United States, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom. A typical load curve in Tokyo spikes at six or seven 
a.m. when commercial buildings open and lights and air conditioning units are turned on. 
The curve then continues at this load level throughout business hours with a slight 
decrease during lunch hours. At hour sixteen or seventeen (16:00 or 17:00) the load 
begins to decrease as consumers leave the office and travel home. As a result, a typical 
load curve’s on-peak hours (higher loads) are between hours seven and seventeen as 
illustrated in Figure 1.2 Significant variables that impact the load curve include 
temperature, humidity, and time of day, week, and year.3  Analysis of the load curve is 
critical in determining changes in demand preferences in the Tokyo area post-Fukushima 
because the curve identifies the hours consumers have targeted to conserve energy and 
the magnitude of these conservation efforts.  
 
 
                                                        
2 TEPCO, “Electricity Market in Japan,” PowerPoint Presentation to Public, July 2004. 
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/presen/pdf-1/0406-e.pdf, accessed February 2012.  
3
 Philip Price, Methods for Analyzing Electricity Load Shape and its Variability (Lawrence Berkeley Lab, 
August 2010), p. 5. 
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Figure 1.  
Typical TEPCO Daily Load Curve (3/1/11) 
 
 
In Japan, demand for electricity can be broken down into three main sectors. 
Industrial buildings use 61.5 percent of electricity, residential buildings use 33.2 percent, 
and commercial buildings use 3.9 percent, while only 1.4 percent is used for other 
purposes such as public, outdoor lighting.4 In terms of volatility, the increase in industrial 
demand each day from trough to peak is only 25 percent, whereas households use three 
times as much electricity at their peak compared to their trough and commercial users use 
                                                        
4Mark Fulton, Michael Carboy, Jane Cao, and Lucy Cotter, “Japan – The Peoples’ Greener Choice,” 
Deutsche Bank Group, August 2011, 
http://nukefreetexas.org/downloads/Japan_The_Peoples_Greener_Choice.pdf, accessed 
October 2011.   
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around ten times as much electricity at their peak compared to their trough.5 These vast 
differences indicate the wide variety of consumer preferences that exist within Japan and 
highlight the volatility that exists within the daily load curve. The large spike within daily 
commercial electricity demand at peak hours suggests that saving measures within this 
sector could be the most beneficial because peak hours typically have the tightest margin 
between electricity supply and demand. The Institute of Energy Economics in Japan 
released a quarterly report stating that office and commercial buildings account for 40 
percent of total electricity consumption during peak demand hours. The report further 
states that commercial consumers have the ability to cut electricity consumption by 2.8 to 
4.7 GW (gigawatt) by turning off lights and increasing indoor temperatures more 
frequently.6 As a result, the Japanese government directed their post-Fukushima 
electricity cuts towards this sector.7  
As a whole, Japan has a limited domestic energy production and imports 83 
percent of its total energy supply. The country is heavily reliant on oil and natural gas 
imports. In an effort to decrease this reliance, Japan built a large number of nuclear 
reactors and swayed public opinion on nuclear power through tax incentives. Before the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan’s target was to have half of its total energy supply 
come from nuclear energy by 2030; however the nuclear disaster has put those plans on 
pause as nuclear power plants are reevaluated and public concern increases. Further 
                                                        
5
 “Japan’s energy crisis: Powerful savings.” The Economist, April 27, 2011. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/04/japans_energy_crisis, accessed October 2011.  
6
 “Summer Electricity Saving Measures and Their Effects for Office and Commercial Buildings,” The 
Institute of Energy Economics, May 2011, accessed October 2011.  
7
 Shigeru Sato, “Tokyo Power Demand Reaches Highest since Quake on Heat Wave,” Bloomberg, June 29, 
2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-29/tokyo-power-demand-reaches-highest-since-
quake-on-heat-wave-2-.html, accessed October 2011. 
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restricting Japan’s energy supply is its grid system, which varies within the country. 
Eastern Japan’s grid was set up using a German 50 Hz AC system, whereas Western 
Japan was designed using a General Electric 60 Hz AC system. Converting between these 
two frequencies requires a complex substation and Japan has only three substations 
capable of this conversion. The aggregate capacity of these substations is 1.2 GW, which 
limits the amount of electricity that can be transferred between the two regions.8 This 
limitation is especially problematic during a supply crisis such as the one that occurred 
after Fukushima, because the two regions cannot share resources easily. 
Another unique facet of Japan’s energy structure is that Japan has ten regional 
monopolies, all part of the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPC). 
While this system may seem similar to the utility structure in the United States, utilities in 
Japan charge residents a flat rate throughout the day, removing incentives to save 
electricity during peak hours9.  Due to the lack of competition, electricity prices for 
Japanese consumers are nearly twice as much the electricity prices paid by Americans 
and three times as much as those paid by South Koreans.10 Market liberalization has been 
marginal and unsupported by big businesses because they sell parts and services to the 
monopolies in exchange for discounted electricity.11 Market liberalization has been 
implemented in stages beginning in March 2000 when consumers using more than 2MW 
of electricity were allowed to purchase from power producers and suppliers (PPSs) 
unassociated with the regional utilities. The next stage began in April 2005 and allowed 
                                                        
8
 Fulton, “Japan – The Peoples’ Greener Choice.” 
9
 “History of Japan’s Electric Power Industry.” Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan. 
http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/energy_electricity/history/index.html, accessed February 2012. 
10
 “Energy in Japan: Bright ideas needed,” The Economist, September 17, 2011. 
http://www.economist.com/node/21529037, accessed October 2011. 
11
 Ibid. 
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consumers whose demand exceeds 50kW to purchase from PPSs. The rest of the 
liberalization plan, which would have affected the majority of the Japanese population, 
was abandoned in March 2008.12 As a result, the electricity market is still very 
constrained; however, Japan’s consumer response to the nuclear disaster has been 
significant given the current structure and government involvement. 
The Fukushima Daiichi disaster eliminated 1.8 percent of Japan’s energy 
capacity.13 Roughly 9.7 GW of nuclear power and 9 GW of thermal power went offline 
instantaneously and TEPCO planned rolling blackouts to ration the limited power supply 
although no blackouts were actually enabled. On March 21, TEPCO’s supply capacity 
was 30 percent below normal peak demand even as TEPCO ramped up functioning plants 
and started up oil-fired backup plants.14 The three major utilities affected (TEPCO, 
Tohoku Electric, and Hokkaido Electric) all would have faced significant negative 
margins if confronted with normal demand circumstances. In this paper, margins refer to 
the difference between current quantity supplied and current quantity demanded. In 
particular, they would have encountered negative six to seven percent shortfalls between 
post-disaster generating capacity and normal levels of demand.  
However, reduced demand (by as much as 25 percent in the Tokyo area) due to 
government regulation and consumer savings created an eight percent reserve margin.15 
                                                        
12 “Fair Competition and Transparency.” Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan. 
http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/energy_electricity/fair_competition/index.html, accessed 
February 2012. 
13
 “Disaster in Japan: Plutonium and Mickey Mouse.” The Economist, March 31, 2011. 
http://www.economist.com/node/18488463, accessed October 2011. 
14
 Tomoko Hosoe, “Japan’s Power Supply Crisis: An Assesment,” East-West Wire, March 21, 2011, 
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/japans-power-supply-crisis-an-
assessment, accessed November 2012.  
15
 Fulton, “Japan – The Peoples’ Greener Choice.”  
13 
 
Japan’s government regulation included electricity saving targets of 15 percent for most 
sectors. Specifically, for industries consuming more than 500kW, the government 
implemented Article 27 of the Electricity Business Act, which required companies within 
the industry to cut electricity consumption by 15 percent between the hours of 9:00 and 
20:00 for the period from July 1, 2011 to September 22, 2011. Failure to yield to these 
restrictions resulted in penalties of up to 1 million yen for each hour in which the target 
was not met.16 The additional power conservation beyond the Japanese government’s 
requirements highlights consumers’ ability to effectively react to a disaster and the 
possibility for considerable change in the daily load curve for electricity within TEPCO’s 
service area.  
In response to the tight supply of energy, Japan’s Ministry of Trade, Economy, 
and Industry (METI), created saving measures and goals for the summer of 2011. On the 
demand side, METI suggested extending and staggering summer holidays, shortening 
operating hours, utilizing facilities outside of Tokyo, installing smart meters to keep 
consumers informed about the amount of electricity they are using, and increasing 
national awareness.17 On the supply side, gas turbines were to be installed, thermal plants 
restored, private power purchased, and supply vehicles increased and diversified. In 
adhering to these suggestions, many industries have responded with significant changes 
to their schedules. Some industrial firms, such as Toyota, have delayed production and 
others have shifted their work hours in order to avoid high-demand periods. For example, 
throughout the summer the Japanese car industry took Thursdays and Fridays off and 
                                                        
16
 Sara Pasquier, “Saving Electricity in a Hurry: Update 2011.” International Energy Agency, June 2011. 
www.iea.org/papers/2011/saving_electricity.pdf, accessed February 2012. 
17
 Ibid. 
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worked on the weekend when electricity demand is significantly lower.18  These changes 
have come at significant economic costs to Japan. Specifically, Japanese automobile 
production in March 2011 was 57.3 percent less than that in the same month last year.19 
In an effort to support economic recovery, the government implemented a number of 
financial packages for small and medium enterprises, which have totaled 10 trillion yen 
to date.20  
 In a report on the crisis, Deutsche Bank Group divides Japan’s recovery from this 
disaster into three phases. Phase I centers on immediate actions focused mostly on 
behavioral changes. Phase II addresses renewable expansion and grid transformation, 
while Phase III addresses long-term energy planning. The immediate removal of a large 
portion of nuclear energy from TEPCO’s electricity supply required that additional power 
be attained through alternative sources. This acquisition was done largely through the 
procurement of natural gas and coal. TEPCO’s short-term solution entailed procuring 
low-sulfur fuel oil from local refineries that had an excess supply due to the short-term 
decline in industrial activities, while also buying crude oil from the market.21 Japan’s 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) and coal imports increased the country’s import bill for the 
two fuels in the five-month period from April 1 to August 31 by 31 percent to 2.45 
trillion yen from the same period a year earlier.22 From a macro perspective, Japan 
                                                        
18
 “Energy in Japan: Bright ideas needed,” The Economist. 
19 Masahisa Fujita and Nobuaki Hamaguchi, “Japan and Economic Integration in East Asia: Post-Disaster 
Scenario,” Annals of Regional Science 48 (2012): 494, accessed April 2012.  
20
 Joni Jupesta and Aki Suwa, “Sustainable Energy Policy in Japan, Post Fukushima,” International 
Association for Energy Economics, Fourth Quarter 2011,  accessed October 2011. 
21
 Hosoe, “Japan’s Power Supply Crisis: An Assesment,” East-West Wire. 
22
 Shigeru Sato and Emi Urabe, “Power Companies Borrow Record in Loans as Cost of FuelJumps: Japan 
Credit,” Bloomberg, October 6, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-06/power- 
companies-borrow-record-in-loans-as-cost-of-fuel-jumps-japan-credit.html, accessed October 
2011. 
15 
 
consumes approximately 65 percent of the LNG shipments to Asia and approximately 35 
percent of worldwide shipments. This increased demand has caused a 50 percent increase 
in spot prices (US$15/mmBTU level), which has not come at a light cost for TEPCO.23 
The immediate effect of the disaster on TEPCO was significant and disastrous. 
TEPCO shares have lost four-fifths of their value and its debt has been downgraded to 
junk. As a result, TEPCO’s president stepped down and the company intends to sell all of 
its assets unrelated to supplying energy. Internal cuts have been considerable, as workers 
have seen wage cuts of as much as 25 percent. TEPCO compensation payments to those 
affected by the disaster could exceed its assets of 186 billion yen.24 A multitude of 
problems would be created for both TEPCO and the government if the company becomes 
insolvent. To prevent insolvency in the short run, TEPCO would need a five percent 
increase in prices contingent upon its nuclear plants restarting in a year and as much as a 
10 percent price increase if the plants cannot be restarted within a year. These price 
changes would barely keep the utility in the black.25 As a result, the government is in the 
process of discussing the future of TEPCO and has considered a few options including 
bankruptcy, nationalization, splitting up transmission and generation into individual 
                                                        
23
 Fulton, “Japan – The Peoples’ Greener Choice.”  
24
 “Power in Japan: The troubles of TEPCO,” The Economist, June 30, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18899008, accessed October 2011. 
25
 Rick Wallace, “Tokyo must decide who will pay to keep Fukushima plant owner TEPCO afloat,” The 
Australian, October 7, 2011, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/tokyo-must-
decide-who-will-pay-to-keep-fukushima-plant-owner-tepco-afloat/story-e6frg9if-1226160647274, 
accessed October 2011. 
16 
 
entities, and establishing an independent government entity that would purchase TEPCO 
assets in return for compensation funding.26  
On November 4th, 2011 the METI approved the release of $64 billion dollars of 
government funding to TEPCO for compensation payments and to avoid insolvency; 
however, the nationalization of TEPCO is still a largely controversial topic throughout 
Japan.27 The METI minister Yukio Edano has indicated that no additional money will be 
released to TEPCO “without the Japanese government gaining a right to take over and 
reform the utility.”28 While some Japanese officials think nationalization is appropriate to 
ensure successful financial and managerial restructuring, others such as Hiromasa 
Yonekura, the chairman of the Japan Business Federation, are against nationalization and 
think electricity rate increases would be a more effective approach to rebuilding the 
company.29 On April 1, 2012, the company raised electricity prices for corporate clients 
by an average of 17 percent, citing higher fuel costs as justification for the increase. This 
increase is the first time the company has raised electricity prices in more than 30 years 
and could potentially push consumers to further increase their conservation efforts.30 The 
success of this decision will have an impact on whether the company is forced to 
nationalize, as such the future of not only TEPCO, but also Japan’s utility system as a 
whole remains uncertain.  
                                                        
26
 “Japan’s nuclear plants: Half-life,” The Economist, May 20, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/05/japans_nuclear_plants, accessed October 
2011. 
27
 “Japan’s nuclear conundrum: The $64 billion question,” The Economist, November 5, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21536600, accessed February 2012. 
28
 Mitsuru Obe, “Japan Business Lobby Head: Against Nationalization of Tepco, Support Electricity Rate 
Hikes,” Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120227-
701005.html?mod=WSJ_qtoverview_wsjlatest, accessed February 2012. 
29
 Ibid., p.1. 
30
 “TEPCO raises electricity prices for corporate clients,” BBC News, January 17, 2012,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16589072, accessed February 2012. 
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Blame for the aftereffects of the nuclear disaster has fluctuated between TEPCO 
and the Japanese government as the Japanese people criticize past and present nuclear 
energy policies. The Economist calls the relationship between TEPCO, the government, 
and the METI “an unholy triangle” because the METI simultaneously oversees the 
regulator that is responsible for addressing utility safety issues and promotes the nuclear 
industry.31 The Fukushima Daiichi plant has malfunctioned multiple times and TEPCO 
has concealed problems since its creation, yet there have been no significant 
consequences for their actions. In fact, Japan’s Supreme Court has never ruled against 
any power company.32 Furthermore, the media reporting on the issue has been regulated 
due to outlets’ inability to scrutinize energy companies because of Japan’s “press club” 
system, which allows the media to ask questions only at formal press conferences. One 
such conference occurred at the first public hearing of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Independent Investigation Commission held on January 16, 2012, months after the 
nuclear disaster. The “press club” is invitation only, so no outlet has openly criticized 
TEPCO, the government, or METI for fear of being dropped from the hearings.33 These 
media limitations have controlled public knowledge of the disaster, heightening the 
public’s uncertainty concerning the future of nuclear energy in Japan.  
The International Association for Energy Economics has reported statistics on 
public opinion concerning nuclear energy issues. They find that 74 percent of Japanese 
voters support abolishing nuclear power after a phase-out period and 65 percent want 
                                                        
31
 “Disaster in Japan: Plutonium and Mickey Mouse.” The Economist, March 31, 2011. 
http://www.economist.com/node/18488463, accessed October 2011. 
32
 Masao Kikuchi and Akira Nakamura, “What We Know, and What We Have Not Yet Learned: Triple 
Disasters and the Fukushima Nuclear Fiasco in Japan,” Public Administration Review 71, (2011): 
895, ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed January 2012.  
33 “Japan’s nuclear crisis: The Meltdown and the Media,” The Economist, January 16, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21542992, accessed February 2012. 
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implementation of renewable power sources even at the expense of higher electricity 
fees.34 As a result of these anti-nuclear sentiments, it is entirely possible that local 
governments could force a shutdown of all of Japan’s nuclear capacity by choosing to 
keep plants in their respective areas shut down. The future of the nuclear industry is 
strongly linked to local government approval because of the structure of regional utilities.  
For example, Kansai Electric regional utility’s (KEPCO) biggest shareholder is 
the city of Osaka. The mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, effectively the company’s 
largest shareholder, has threatened to “end KEPCO’s monopoly on power generation and 
distribution” if the utility does not keep ten of its eleven nuclear reactors shut down.35 
Due to similar sentiments throughout Japan, 48 out of 54 nuclear reactors were out 
service as of January 7, 2012 without any sign of being turned back on in the near 
future.36 Aggregately, these anti-nuclear efforts could potentially lead to a 30 percent 
decrease in energy supply and, therefore, alternative measures would need to be taken. 
However, in the short term Japan’s prime minister Yoshihiko Noda insists that it is 
“absolutely impossible” for Japan to survive next summer’s demand needs without 
nuclear power.37 On April 13, 2011, the Japanese government announced that two 
nuclear reactors at the Oi plant in western Japan were safe to restart; however, the 
government is now faced with the decision of whether or not to turn them on.38 While it 
                                                        
34
 Jupesta, “Sustainable Energy Policy in Japan, Post   Fukushima.”  
35
 “Japan’s energy crisis: Nuclear winter,” The Economist, December 10, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21541464, accessed February 2012. 
36
 “The Fukushima Black Box: A dangerous lack of urgency in drawing lessons from Japan’s nuclear 
disaster,” The Economist, January 7, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21542437, accessed 
February 2012.  
37
  “An Anti-nuclear Protest in Japan: Sayonara, nukes, but not yet,” The Economist, September 24, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21530147, accessed February 2012. 
38
 Mari Iwata and Eleanor Warnock, “Japan Government Deems 2 Reactors Safe,” Wall Street Journal, 
April 13, 2012, 
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is deemed necessary in order to avoid blackouts this coming summer and the national 
government has the final say regarding the plant’s operation, the government and the 
utilities also have a duty to act in line with the wants and needs of the Japanese people.   
The government ended “setsuden”, its energy conservation protocols, on 
September 9, 2011 as energy demand decreased due to cooler temperatures and energy 
supply increased as Japan’s energy portfolio expanded.  However as Japan looks ahead, 
there are many additional factors to consider regarding daily electricity consumption.39 
Japan’s energy demand is declining due to its aging and shrinking population, which 
could lead to a decrease in the daily load curve for all hours.40 In addition, if the Japanese 
continue their conservation measures Deutsche Bank Group reports an estimated annual 
improvement in electricity intensity (primary energy consumption/GDP) of 2.2 percent 
rather than the 1.5 percent estimated before Fukushima. This increased efficiency in 
electricity use combined with a declining population could yield notable changes in 
future demand for electricity.  
Continued conservation measures can already be seen by some practicing self-
imposed “setsuden” in the winter months even though all government restrictions have 
expired. The Japan Soft Drink Association is not refrigerating vending machines during 
the day and is changing fluorescent bulbs to LED lighting in areas with a sensitive energy 
supply.41 Another example is the Tokyo Tower, which has cut the number of hours it will 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303624004577341591983335470.html, accessed 
April 2012 
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be lit up by half as of December 2011.42 While each of these efforts might seem 
insignificant individually, the effect on total electricity demand in Japan has been 
substantial and Reuters reported in January 2012 that Japan was experiencing the 
“eleventh straight month of year-on-year declines.”43 When coupled with a shrinking 
population, these “setsuden” have the potential to significantly decrease the daily load 
curve. In order to promote this long-term shift, TEPCO plans on deploying smart meters 
to a minimum of 80 percent of the utility’s total service territory, allowing consumers to 
monitor real-time price signals.44 While all of these efforts suggest a decrease in energy 
demand for Japan in the long run, nuclear energy will most likely remain a necessary 
element to Japan’s energy portfolio until substantial progress has been made regarding 
the implementation of a new grid system, which is necessary in order to deal with the 
intermittencies and transmission associated with renewable integration. This substantial 
progress could take many years to implement.  
Literature Review: 
Disasters have become a growing topic in economic research as heated discussion 
about global warming, population growth, and urbanization indicate that disasters will 
become increasingly relevant economically. Global warming is expected to bring more 
frequent, volatile disasters and urbanization increases the damage of disasters in heavily 
populated, localized areas, thus the economic effects of disasters are becoming 
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increasingly more significant.45 There are two distinct types of disasters: natural disasters 
and complex emergencies. Natural disasters are caused by a natural phenomenon and 
affect “a population or area and may result in severe damage and destruction and 
increased morbidity and mortality that overwhelm local coping capacity”.46 In contrast, 
complex emergencies are caused by human actions and “mortality among the civilian 
population substantially increases above the population baseline mortality, either as a 
result of the direct effects of war or conflict, or indirectly through the increased 
prevalence of malnutrition and/or transmission of communicable diseases.”47 Paul 
Spiegel’s 2005 paper, “Differences in World Responses to Natural Disasters and 
Complex Emergencies,” explores the similarities and differences between the two forms 
of disasters.  
Spiegel (2005) argues that response to natural disasters is greater than response to 
complex emergencies, both politically and financially, because natural disasters are less 
politically risky, easier to address, and often more sudden and unexpected.48 The 
consequences of both types of disaster usually result in increased basic health needs and 
short and long-term mental health effects; however, natural disasters such as the one that 
occurred in Japan in March 2011 typically result in deaths and injuries rather than long-
term food scarcity and migration. Another major response catalyst is media coverage and 
the socioeconomic status of those affected by the disaster, as countries will respond with 
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greater magnitude if their citizens are empathetic to the disaster victims.49  Each of the 
numerous natural disasters that Spiegel (2005) examines received immediate and 
significant funds from sources worldwide, whereas funding was less evident for the 
complex emergencies analyzed. Spiegel (2005) concludes that “it is easier to ‘do no 
harm’ when responding to a natural disaster than a complex emergency.50 While it may 
be “easier” to respond to a natural disaster, the factors that go into that response and their 
results prove to be complex and vary by country and disaster type.  
While research on disasters has become more extensive, the results are divided on 
both the short-term and long-term level. Raddatz (2007) compares the short-term effects 
of humanitarian disasters (wars, famines, etc.) and climatic disasters (floods, droughts, 
etc.), finding that both have a negative relationship with per-capita income. On average, 
climatic and humanitarian disasters cause two and four percent real per-capita income 
losses, respectively.51 Noy (2009) examines natural disasters worldwide, specifically 
those from 1970 to 2003, and finds a relationship similar to Raddatz, adding that adverse 
short-run effects are worsened by a lack of development, education, income, openness to 
trade, and government spending.52 Sarmiento (2007) looks at the effect of climatic 
disasters on short-run, local employment by analyzing a US flood panel data set and finds 
that local employment falls by an average of 3.4 percent after a climatic disaster.53 
However, Xiao (2011) runs a time series regression on data from the 1993 Midwest 
Flood and finds stable employment levels in the disaster year and after, contradicting 
Sarmiento. In addition, Xiao (2011) finds short-run declines in per-capita income in the 
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year of the event, which rebounded the following year.54 Belasen and Polacheck (2009) 
did a similar study looking at hurricane data, finding that income in the affected area 
grew by 4.35 percent due to increased labor demand and decreased labor supply in the 
affected area and fell by 4.51 percent in neighboring counties due to increased labor 
supply resulting from relocation.55 While views on the short-run impacts of disasters on 
unemployment seem to vary by region and time, these economists agree that short-run 
per-capita income decreases immediately following a disaster.  
Albala-Bertrand (1993) finds contrasting results when using a simple 
macroeconomic model to look at the effect of sudden, large (at least 5 percent of loss-to-
GDP ratio) natural disasters on the growth rate of output. He argues that “economic 
effects of large localized natural disasters … rarely affect negatively actual aggregate 
output. If anything there often appears to be a positive short-term effect on GDP.”56 
Bertrand examines six disasters in six different countries, three climatic and three 
geologic, and finds that in four of the six instances countries show both positive and 
improved growth rates in the disaster year and thereafter. The two exceptions are shown 
to be the result of causes unrelated to the disaster.57 Albala-Bertrand (1993) further 
argues that natural disasters result in positive short-term growth in the book, Political 
Economy of Large Natural Disasters. In this work, his before-after statistical analysis of 
28 natural disasters in 26 countries resulted in a 0.4 percent average increase in GDP, 
unchanged inflation, increased capital formation, increases in agricultural and 
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construction output, increases in fiscal and trade deficits, and increased reserves.58 More 
recently, Noy and Vu (2010) performed a case study to measure the forgone production 
resulting from natural disasters in 64 Vietnamese provinces from 1965 to 2006. They find 
that more costly disasters appear to boost the economy in the short-run.59 Tol and Leek 
(1999) further support these results by suggesting that GDP increases after natural 
disasters because GDP focuses on the flow of new production, which occurs because 
natural disasters destroy capital stock and therefore ensure increased production in the 
short-run.60  Their results are supported by the creative destruction hypothesis, which 
states that natural disasters foster adoption of new technology and are an opportunity to 
increase the efficiency of capital stock.61 Although the research seems fairly evenly 
divided on the short-term effects of natural disasters, the literature that results in positive, 
short-term growth seems to include more evidence involving geologic disasters, such as 
the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.   
In terms of the long-run economic effects of natural disasters, Skidmore & Toya 
(2002) are widely cited, but many counter-arguments exist as well. Skidmore & Toya 
(2002) use a semi-logarithmic regression containing disaster data for 89 countries 
between 1960 and 1990. Their statistical analysis “yields a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between number of disasters and economic growth, explaining as 
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much as nine percent of the variation in the growth of per capita GDP.”62 They further 
divide the data set by region, finding Asia is the most disaster-prone region both in terms 
of number of events and deaths.63 Their final conclusion, dividing the set by disaster type, 
resulted in a positive correlation between climatic disasters and “economic growth, 
human capital investment, and growth in total factor productivity, whereas geologic 
disasters are negatively correlated with growth.”64 Miguel & Roland (2010) find similar 
positive long-term results from national disasters, but rather than looking at natural 
disasters, they examine war disasters, specifically the effects of the US bombing in 
Vietnam. They look at bombing intensities in 458 Vietnamese districts and find that the 
US bombing in the Vietnam War did not have negative impacts on “local poverty rates, 
consumption levels, infrastructure, literacy, or population density through 2002.”65 They 
cite the neoclassical growth model as a possible explanation, stating “if war leads to the 
partial destruction of the physical capital stock but the production function remains 
unchanged, there will be a temporary increase in capital accumulation until the steady 
state is again attained.”66   
Hallegatte & Dumas (2009) contrast this theory of positive, long run growth post-
disaster by arguing that a “poverty trap” exists that decreases the positive effect of a 
disaster on GDP.  This decrease was especially evident in low-income countries, because 
instead of investing in newer, more efficient technology, countries replace damaged 
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capital with the same capital used in the past to prevent short-term productivity losses.67 
Noy & Nualsari (2007) and Raddatz (2009) provide further counterarguments to 
Skidmore & Toya (2002). Both find that disasters have contractionary long-run effects on 
GDP using panel data of five-year country observations and cumulative impulse response 
functions, respectively. Long-term research is fairly divided due to the difficulty in 
constructing models that account for what would have happened to GDP in the absence 
of the natural disaster. 68  
 Rather than looking at the short-term vs. long-term effects of natural disasters, 
economists have looked at a country’s level of development as an explanation of the 
varying economic effects of natural disasters. Kallenberg & Mobarak (2007) find an 
inverse U-shape relationship between a country’s level of development and its economic 
losses due to floods and windstorms. However, they find a negative relationship between 
increased development and economic losses for geologic disasters. They find a similar 
inverse U-shape when looking at the relationship between income and deaths from 
natural disasters.69 Both of these relationships indicate more developed countries are less 
affected by a natural disaster than are less developed countries. Noy & Nualsri (2011) 
further analyze this relationship between development and post-disaster economic effects, 
exploring fiscal behavior in a study involving quarterly disaster data from 22 developed 
countries and 20 developing countries.70 They find post-disaster counter-cyclical fiscal 
behavior in developed countries and post-disaster pro-cyclical fiscal behavior in 
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developing countries. In developed countries, their results yield an immediate 1.27 
percent of GDP decrease in government revenue, a 0.46 percent of GDP increase in 
government payment (peaking in the third quarter of the disaster year), and a 0.28 percent 
of GDP decrease in government cash surplus. In developing countries, inverse results are 
presented, including decreases in government consumption, government revenue, 
government payment, and outstanding debt on impact.71 This paper further defines the 
relationship between natural disasters and economic development, highlighting the 
adverse effects of poor economic strategies post-disaster in developing countries and 
their extended, undesirable macroeconomic outcomes.  
 In addition to the economic development literature mentioned thus far, 
Schumacher & Strobl (2011) find more complex results when they take into 
consideration the level of hazard exposure a country faces. They find that the relationship 
between wealth and losses depends on hazard exposure. If a country has low hazard 
exposure, they find an inverse U-shape relationship similar to the one mentioned by 
Kallenberg and Mobarak (2007) with low wealth countries facing increasing losses due to 
the small marginal benefit for adaption expenditure.72 However, if a country faces high 
hazard exposure they find a U-shape relationship between wealth and economic losses. 
They explain this relationship by citing the effect of decreasing marginal returns on 
excessive investment in preventative measures for wealthy countries and by identifying 
that poorer countries are more willing to take preventative measures because they will 
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have a greater percent of their wealth destroyed by a disaster.73 This argument provides 
an interesting supplement to the existing literature because many developed countries, 
such as Japan, face significant economic losses following natural disasters, suggesting 
that they could be inefficiently allocating resources to preventative efforts. 
 Further studies have been done in hopes of explaining the effects of disasters at 
different levels of development, including examining the impacts on a country’s 
government structure, business cycle, technological development, and household 
structure. Kallenberg & Mobarak (2011) examine the relationship between disaster 
recovery and democratic governments, finding that “democratic governments are 
expected to have a positive effect on addressing the impact of disaster because they will 
be held accountable for their disaster preparations and respond to post-disaster 
assistance.”74 Hallegatte & Ghal (2008) argue that economies are more likely to suffer 
negative consequences to growth during periods of expansion because their productive 
capital is more vulnerable, whereas countries in a recession are able to use their excess 
capacity to respond to a disaster.75  Escaleras & Register (2008) analyze 146 earthquake-
generated tsunamis between 1966 and 2004 and find that countries that employ advanced 
technologies are better able to predict disaster events and disseminate warnings to the 
public.76 Carter et al. (2007) examine household response to natural disasters and find 
“households above a certain threshold will be more likely to borrow against their assets 
or future earnings” and therefore recover from the disaster more quickly.77 Another study 
involving household response to disasters was done by Smith et al. (2006) and further 
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highlights the differing responses to disasters that occur based on wealth. The paper 
indentifies that higher income households do not relocate post-disaster, middle-income 
household move away from the disaster zone, and lower-income households often move 
into the disaster area in order to benefit from decreased property prices.78 The multiple 
factors involved in estimating the post-disaster effects of a natural disaster illustrate the 
existing complexities in interpreting the economic and political implications that result in 
both the short term and long term following a natural disaster.  
This paper’s focus on the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami of 2011 and the 
resulting nuclear disaster will add a special case study to the existing literature because it 
examines the economic effects of both a natural disaster and a complex emergency. 
While this paper highlights the localized impacts of the disasters on the electricity market 
in Tokyo specifically, it estimates the magnitude of the disaster and proposes a timeline 
for the recovery of the Japanese electricity market. As a result, this paper provides insight 
into the reactions of both the Japanese government and the consumer to the March 2011 
disasters, as well as explains the implications of these reactions on Japan’s economy as a 
whole.   
Event Study Methodology: 
 This paper will use event study methodology to formulate the framework for 
analyzing the significance of the Fukushima disaster on TEPCO’s electricity loads. The 
majority of event study papers have used this methodology to “measure the effects of an 
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economic event on the value of firms.”79 The data used in these academic papers is 
largely based on the stock prices of a specific firm or industry. The null hypothesis for an 
event study is typically that the event has no impact on the behavior of returns. Three 
periods are used to calculate and analyze the significance of these returns. These periods 
include the estimation window, which is a period of time before the event, an event 
window, which includes the event being examined, and the post-event window, which is 
a period of time after the event has occurred. To determine the effect of an event on stock 
prices, abnormal returns are calculated based on the difference between actual returns 
that occurred in the event window and the expected returns, which are based on returns in 
the estimation period.80  
Expected returns are calculated based on one of two approaches: the constant 
mean return model or the market model. The constant mean return model uses the mean 
return of the firm or industry being examined during an estimation period to calculate 
predicted returns. The market model uses a market return (typically based on a major 
index) and is the method more widely chosen because it takes “explicit account of the 
risk associated with the market and mean returns” given the model has a strong R2 
value.81 Abnormal returns are then assumed to be normally distributed around zero and 
are tested for significance. There are many ways of analyzing these abnormal returns 
including aggregating the abnormal returns into a cumulative abnormal return or taking 
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an average abnormal return.82 The significance of these returns is then used to represent 
the power of the event in shifting stock prices unexpectedly within the event window. 
The event window ranges in size based on the event being studied, but is often fairly 
small due to the ability for stock prices to respond quickly to events.83  
For example, one event study in the International Research Journal of Finance 
and Economics titled “The Impact of Terrorism on Greek Banks’ Stocks” looks at three 
terrorist events: the September 11 attacks, the 2004 Madrid train bombing, and the 2005 
London train bombing.  A wide range of event windows are used, ranging from thirty 
days before and after the event to one day before and after the event.84 The abnormal 
returns are calculated using the Market Model Method and the Athens Stock Exchange, 
and the results show that only September 11 had significant abnormal returns.85 Another 
example is Andreas Keller’s “Competition effects of mergers: An event study of the 
German electricity market,” which examines the effect of eight different public 
announcements by the Swedish company Vattenfall, which acquired three regional utility 
companies in Germany during the period 1999 to 2002. The announcements vary from 
announcing interest in a utility to acquiring one. A seven-day event window, ranging 
from two days before the announcement to four days after, is used for each 
announcement along with an estimation period of 89 days that ends 11 days before each 
event. Abnormal returns for the utility companies are calculated using the Market Model 
Method and the DAX (German index). The results indicate that Vattenfall did not have 
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an anti-competitive effect on the German electricity market due to the lack of 
significance in stock price changes during their announcement event windows.86   
Many of the details mentioned in the papers discussed above are not implemented 
here because this paper is not centered on financial data, but rather the electricity loads of 
an individual utility. An “abnormal return” cannot be used in this paper because a Market 
Model Method cannot be applied to electricity loads due to the lack of a market index 
that would provide an accurate benchmark for the Japanese electricity market. As a 
result, the significance of the event is captured through a different lens: a time series 
regression. This paper looks at the effect of the Fukushima nuclear disaster on electricity 
loads through a regression that highlights the hourly shifts in electricity load after the 
event. Similar to the studies mentioned above, this study tests the significance of hourly 
loads after the disaster by comparing them to the hourly variables for the entire data set. 
However, rather than doing this significance test by calculating abnormal returns, dummy 
variables are used to capture the significance of the hourly load changes. Due to the large 
scale of the nuclear disaster, four event windows are used, ranging from a week after the 
disaster to the end of 2011 (the end of the data set). The goal of these event windows is to 
capture both short-term and long-term effects of the disasters. A thorough explanation of 
the model is presented in the following section.  
Model: 
The first time series regression model, Model (1) is:  
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(1) Load = βo + β1 disaster + β2 holiday + β3Max + β4Min+ β5atrend + β6dtrend+ 
β7lpopulation + β8Sun  + β9Mon + β10Tue + β11Thu + β12Fri  + β13Sat + β14Feb 
+ β15Mar + β16Apr + β17May + β18Jun + β19Jul + β20Aug + β21Sep + β22 Oct + 
β23Nov + β24Dec + β25one +β26two + β27four + … + β45twentytwo + 
β46twentythree +ut 
 
The second model, Model (2), looks identical to the first except the dependent variable is 
lLoad, the log of Load. The log form is used in addition to the unmodified loads to make 
the variable more comprehensible. The third regression, Model (3), includes interactive 
hourly disaster dummy variables:  
(3) Load = βo  + β1 holiday + β2Max + β3Min+ β4atrend + β5dtrend+ β6lpopulation 
+ β7Sun  + β8Mon + β9Tue + β10Thu + β11Fri  + β12Sat + β13Feb + β14Mar + 
β15Apr + β16May + β17Jun + β18Jul + β19Aug + β20Sep + β21 Oct + β22Nov + 
β23Dec + β24zero + β25one + β26two + β27four + … + β45twentytwo + 
β46twentythree + β47dzero + β48done + β49dtwo + β50dfour + … +β68dtwentytwo 
+ β69dtwentythree + ut 
 
Model (4) looks identical to the third except the dependent variable is lLoad.  
The dependent variables, Load and lLoad, represent the hourly electricity loads 
(unit of 10 thousand KW) and log of hourly electricity loads for TEPCO from January 1, 
2008 to December 31, 2011, respectively. The independent variables that determine the 
significance of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident are disaster (dweek, dmonth, 
dsummer), hourly variables one through twentythree, interactive hourly disaster variables 
done through dtwentythree, and a trend variable dtrend. disaster is a dummy variable that 
is zero until March 11, 2011 and then one through the rest of the data set, representing the 
event window. The event window extends through the rest of the year due to the 
magnitude of the event. While the earthquake and ensuing tsunami took place on March 
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11, nuclear reactors were exploding through March 15 and operations at the Fukushima 
Daiichi plant were not suspended until March 16.87  Beyond that, a cold shut down of the 
plant was not achieved until December 2011.88 On a macro level, nuclear reactors in 
Japan are still being shut down; the last of the 56 nuclear reactors shuts down in April or 
May of 2012.89 As a result of these continued consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi 
disaster, the event window extends to the end of the data set. Additionally, alternative 
event windows are substituted for disaster in order to further analyze the short and long-
term effects of the disaster. dweek is a dummy variable that is one from March 11, 2011 
to March 16, 2011, representing the immediate effects of the disaster. Finally, dmonth is a 
dummy variable that is one from March 11, 2011 to March 31, 2011, representing the 
short-term effects of the disaster. dsummer is a dummy variable that is one from March 
11, 2011 to August 31, 2011, representing the medium-term effects of the disaster. These 
variables provide a detailed look into the lasting impacts of the Fukushima Daiichi 
disaster.  
The hourly disaster interactive variables, done through dtwentythree are disaster 
multiplied by corresponding hourly dummy variables, one through twentythree. A 
disaster trend variable, dtrend, is included to capture the load movement after the nuclear 
accident. The variable starts at one on March 11, 2011 and increases monthly by one, 
ending at 10. An annual trend variable, atrend, is also used to indicate movements in the 
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load throughout the entire data set. The variable starts one and increases annually, ending 
at four. A population variable, lpopulation, is included in log form to account for annual 
changes in the Japanese population, which is slowly declining. time increases hourly 
throughout the entire data set.   
Daily maximum and minimum temperatures for Tokyo, Max and Min (measured 
in degrees Celsius), are used in order to control for temporal impacts on load such as 
higher temperatures leading to the use of more air conditioning units and therefore 
greater demand for electricity. Dummy variables will be used to control for month (Feb 
to Dec), day of the week (Sun to Sat excluding Wed), hour (zero to twentythree excluding 
three), and holidays (holiday). The holiday dummy variable is one for every major 
holiday in Japan and is used to control for load changes based on businesses being closed. 
I chose to eliminate Wednesday, January, and hour three from the regression to 
avoid multicollinearity.  I am assuming that these time variables are the least significant 
in terms of load volatility. Wed was chosen because it is in the middle of the week and 
therefore fairly predictable in comparison to the other days. Jan was eliminated because it 
is in the winter, which tends to be less volatile than the summer months when comparing 
temperature swings and the use of air conditioning units. three was eliminated because it 
is one of hours with the lowest demand for electricity because businesses are not running 
and consumers are sleeping. In addition to eliminating these dummy variables, dtrendsq, 
the disaster trend variable dtrend squared, and lagged load variables were eliminated due 
to their insignificant effect on the model. Table 1 provides a brief description of all of the 
variables used in this paper’s models.  
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Table 1.  
Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Name Description Variable Name  Description 
Load  Electricity load (10 
thousand KW) 
eight Hour 8  
lLoad Log of Electricity load 
(10 thousand KW) 
nine Hour 9  
Max  Maximum Temperatures 
(Celsius)  
ten  Hour 10 
Min Minimum Temperatures 
(Celsius) 
eleven Hour 11 
holiday Holidays twelve Hour 12 
disaster  March 11th – December 
31st 2011 
thirteen Hour 13 
dweek March 11th – March 
16th 2011 
fourteen Hour 14 
dmonth March 11th – March 31st 
2011 
fifteen Hour 15 
dsummer March 11th – August 
31st 2011 
sixteen Hour 16 
hour  Hours 0 -23 seventeen  Hour 17 
atrend Annual Trend (2008-
2011) 
eighteen  Hour 18 
dtrend Monthly Trend post-
disaster (3/11-12/11) 
nineteen Hour 19 
population Japan Population twenty Hour 20 
lpopulation Log of population twentyone Hour 21 
time  Time Series variable twentytwo Hour 22 
Jan January twentythree Hour 23 
Feb February dzero Disaster Hour 0 
Mar March done Disaster Hour 1 
Apr April dtwo Disaster Hour 2 
May May dthree Disaster Hour 3 
Jun June dfour Disaster Hour 4 
Jul  July dfive Disaster Hour 5 
Aug August dsix Disaster Hour 6 
Sep September dseven Disaster Hour 7  
Oct October deight Disaster Hour 8  
Nov November dnine Disaster Hour 9 
Dec December dten Disaster Hour 10 
Sun Sunday deleven Disaster Hour 11 
Mon Monday dtwelve Disaster Hour 12 
Tue Tuesday dthirteen Disaster Hour 13 
Wed Wednesday dfourteen Disaster Hour 14 
Thu Thursday dfifteen Disaster Hour 15 
Fri Friday dsixteen Disaster Hour 16 
Sat Saturday dseventeen Disaster Hour 17 
zero Hour 0 deighteen Disaster Hour 18  
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one  Hour 1  dnineteen Disaster Hour 19 
two  Hour 2 dtwenty Disaster Hour 20 
three Hour 3 dtwentyone Disaster Hour 21 
four Hour 4 dtwentytwo Disaster Hour 22 
five Hour 5 dtwentythree Disaster Hour 23 
six  Hour 6 datef Date (1/1/08 – 12/31/11) 
seven Hour 7  
    
 
Data: 
Observations for this paper were taken every hour for years 2008 through 2011, 
creating a time series data set. There are 35,064 observations for each variable. The 
hourly electricity loads, Load, are published on TEPCO’s website and the data set is 
updated daily.  The data represents the demand for electricity for the entire service area.90 
The maximum and minimum temperatures for Tokyo, Max and Min, were collected from 
a website, TuTiempo, which provides weather information for regions around the 
world.91  The temperatures are daily and a macro was used to format the data into my 
hourly data set. Japanese holidays, identified in the dummy variable holiday, are chosen 
based on the observed holidays listed on timeanddate.com.92  The annual Japanese 
population size, population, was taken from data collected by The World Bank.93  
The data was collected in January 2012 and entered into STATA. The variables 
and summary statistics seem reasonable and as a result provide reasonably accurate 
estimates of the variables’ effects on TEPCO’s electricity load; however, autocorrelation 
                                                        
90
 Tokyo Electric Power Company, “Electricity Forecast,” Tokyo Electric Power Company website, 
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/forecast/html/download-e.html, accessed September 2011.  
91
 Tu Tiempo, “Climate Tokyo – Historical Weather,” Tu Tiempo website, 
http://www.tutiempo.net/en/Climate/Tokyo/476620.htm, accessed December 2011.  
92
 Time and Date, “Calendar for year 2011 (Japan),” Time and Date website, 
http://www.timeanddate.com/calendar/?year=2011&country=26, accessed February 2012. 
93
 The World Bank, “Data: Japan,” The World Bank website, http://data.worldbank.org/country/japan, 
accessed March 2012.  
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was initially a problem for all of my regressions. A Durbin Watson test produced values 
of 0.288, 0.321, 0.097, and 0.106 for models (1), (2), (3), and (4) respectively, indicating 
significant autocorrelation. A Prais-Winston transformation was initially done to correct 
for this autocorrelation, but yielded Durbin-Watson values that were still well below the 
desired values. This result led me to believe that an AR(1) correction would not fix the 
issue, so Newey West standard errors were used instead. Using a Breusch Godfrey test, 
lags of 6, 12, 18, and 24 were tested and found to be significant. However, a lag of 24 
was chosen due to the hourly division of the data. These tests and the resulting Newey 
West transformation are assumed to have corrected the autocorrelation.  
Table 2. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Load  3519.566 704.245 2048 6089 
lLoad  8.146 0.199 7.625 8.714 
Max 20.284 8.151 1.7 37.2 
Min 13.057 8.229 -1.1 28.6 
holiday 0.044 0.206 0 1 
disaster 0.203 0.402 0 1 
dweek 0.004 0.064 0 1 
dmonth 0.023 0.148 0 1 
dsummer 0.120 0.325 0 1 
hour 11.5 6.922 0 23 
atrend 2.499 1.118 1 4 
dtrend 1.145 2.598 0 10 
population 127297030 482639.9 126475664 127704040 
lpopulation 18.662 0.004 18.656 18.665 
time 17532.5 10122.25 1 35064 
Feb 0.077 0.267 0  1 
Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Aug, Oct, Dec 0.085 0.279 0 1 
Apr, Jun, Sep, Nov 0.082 0.276 0 1 
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Sun, Mon 0.142 0.349 0 1 
Tue, Wed, Thu, Fri, Sat 0.143 0.350 0 1 
zero, one, two…twentythree 0.042 0.200 0 1 
dzero, done, dtwo…dtwentythree 0.008 0.091 0 1 
datef 18262 421.760 16532 18992 
 
Results:  
I expected the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster to have a significant, negative 
impact on TEPCO’s electricity load and found results consistent with this hypothesis. All 
results for Models (1) and (2) can be found in Table 3 in the Appendix. 
All of the variables are significant at the one percent level except for Tue, Thu, 
Fri, Feb, and atrend. These variables are insignificant because load is more predictable 
and less volatile during the week and in the winter. As seen in Table 3, the disaster 
variable is extremely significant with a t-statistic of -13.18. These results estimate that if 
the disaster variable is triggered (if the date is within the event window), there is a 
652.752 (10 thousand KW) decrease in electricity load. This significant decrease in load 
showcases the magnitude of the disaster’s impact on electricity load. The trend variable 
atrend suggests a decrease in the demand for electricity throughout the entire data set, 
which coincides with Japan’s declining population. Although the variable is not 
significant, each additional year shows decreased electricity load by 19.069 (10 thousand 
KW). Conversely, the disaster trend variable, dtrend, is significant and positive 
suggesting that load is increasing as time passes post-Fukushima. For every month after 
the nuclear disaster, electricity load increases by 33.592 (10 thousand KW).  
Taking a deeper look into the significance of the dtrend and atrend variables on 
Load, an approximate timeline is estimated regarding the disaster’s lasting effects on 
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electricity load. An average of hourly pre-disaster loads is taken from January 1, 2008 to 
March 10, 2011 and is used as a benchmark for reaching pre-disaster loads (3604. 976 10 
thousand KW). The disaster coefficient is used as a representation of the disaster’s 
lasting effects on the load (-652.752 10 thousand KW). To calculate the number of 
months until pre-disaster load is reached, the dtrend and the atrend are combined by first 
dividing the atrend coefficient by twelve and then adding them together to get a monthly 
averaged increase in load since the disaster date, March 11, 2011. Based on these 
averaged calculations and ignoring all other variables and factors, Model (1) 
approximates load will take 20.396 months to reach the pre-disaster hourly load average. 
Although this model suggests TEPCO’s loads will recover in November 2012, factors 
such as the future structure of both TEPCO and the utility industry as a whole, as well as 
other future economic and political implications could disrupt this recovery timeline.       
Figures 2 and 3 visually depict the annual trend, disaster trend, and the significant, 
extended decrease in load due to the Fukushima Daiichi disaster (marked with a red line). 
Both Figures 2 and 3 are based on average daily loads over time. 
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Figure 2. 
TEPCO’s 2008-2011 Electricity Load 
 
 
Figure 3.  
TEPCO’s 2011 Electricity Load 
 
 
 Additional event windows are substituted for the variable disaster in order to 
determine the lasting impacts of the disaster on electricity load. Model (1) is used for the 
regression and the event window variables are substituted in for the dummy variable, 
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disaster. Table 4 includes the varying event windows and their corresponding regression 
results.  
Table 4. 
Model (1) Results Substituting Different Event Windows 
Load Event Window Coefficient t P>|t| 
dweek (0,5) -424.3112 -3.04 0.002 
dmonth (0,20) -361.418 -6.84 0.000 
dsummer (0,173) -377.105 -11.6 0.000 
disaster (0,295) -652.752 -13.18 0.000 
 
 
 All of the disaster variables are significant at the one percent level. The variable 
dweek, representing the short-term event window, yields a 424.3112 (10 thousand KW) 
decrease in load. This variable highlights the significant, immediate impact of the disaster 
on Tokyo’s electricity market. dmonth and dsummer are slightly more significant, largely 
due to their lengthier event windows, but decrease load by 361.418 and 377.105 (10 
thousand KW), respectively, which is less than the short-term event window variable, 
dweek. The most notable result is the original variable, disaster. The magnitude of this 
variable, in comparison to the smaller event windows, is unexpected due to its large 
impact on electricity load. Given that the other variables’ effect on load decreased as the 
event window increased, the contrary effect of disaster suggests an additional underlying 
cause for lasting, decreased load beyond the factors that are controlled for in this model 
(temperature, seasonality, etc.). Figures 4 (dweek), 5 (dmonth), 6 (dsummer), and 7 
(disaster) illustrate the various load levels for the different event windows. The 
Fukushima Daiichi disaster is marked with a red line.  
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Figure 4.94 
TEPCO’S March 10-16, 2011 Electricity Load 
 
 
Figure 5.  
TEPCO’s March 2011 Electricity Load 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
94
 Figure 4 includes hourly loads, whereas Figures 5, 6, and 7 include daily averages of hourly loads  
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Figure 6. 
TEPCO’S March 11 – August 31, 2011 Electricity Load 
 
Figure 7. 
TEPCO’S March 11 - December 2011 Electricity Load 
 
 
Other time dummy variables that have a notable effect on electricity load include 
Sat, Sun, and the cooler months such as Sep through Dec (Table 3).  All of these variables 
impact the load negatively. Sat and Sun decrease load by 305.572 and 489.199 (10 
thousand KW) respectively. Sep, Oct, Nov, and Dec decrease load by 458.222, 757.613, 
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521.464, and 217.244 (10 thousand KW) respectively. These results are somewhat 
expected and supported by my Literature Review as the decreased demand for electricity 
on the weekends resulted from businesses being closed. Similarly, decreased demand in 
the winter months resulted from cooler temperatures and the lack of air conditioner use. 
holiday is also negatively significant, decreasing load by 360.843 if triggered, due to 
consumers staying at home and businesses being closed. Daily temperatures, Max and 
Min, impacted the load in slightly unexpected ways. Max decreased load by 9.592 (10 
thousand KW), which does not follow the assumption that higher temperatures lead to an 
increased load. However, the Min coefficient supported this assumption in that the higher 
the minimum temperature the higher the demand for electricity, with a coefficient of 
24.938.   
As seen in Table 3, Model (2) produced similar results in terms of the significance 
of the independent variables. Again Tue, Thu, Fri, Feb, and atrend are insignificant 
whereas the rest of the variables are significant at the one percent level. The variable 
disaster suggests that if the dummy variable is triggered there is a 19.192 percent 
decrease in TEPCO’s electricity load. This decrease is extreme and could suggest that 
consumers in the TEPCO service area decreased their electricity consumption by more 
than was required by the Japanese government, a hypothesis that is supported in my 
Institutional Background and Literature Review. These excess saving measures are even 
more notable in a country that has fixed electricity prices because even though there were 
tight supply margins there were no price spikes to provide additional incentive to save 
during these hours.  
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The disaster trend variable dtrend indicates for a monthly increase in time after 
the disaster, load increases by 1.061 percent (Table 3). The hourly variables zero through 
twentythree are the most significant variables in the regression with t-statistics ranging 
from 9.83 (hour five) to 192.34 (hour eighteen). Due to the significance of these variables 
and their relationship to the daily load curve, models (3) and (4) examine the effect of the 
hour on electricity load by looking at hourly and interactive hourly disaster variables and 
comparing their magnitude and direction. All results for Models (3) and (4) can be found 
in Table 5 in the Appendix. 
The regression results for model (3) indicate significance for all variables 
except atrend, lpopulation, Tue, Thu, Fri, Feb, and the constant. Examining the 
hourly variables, the hourly dummy variables that represent the entire data set, zero 
through twentythree, have a positive effect on the electricity load; whereas, the 
disaster hourly interactive variables, dzero through dtwentythree, have a negative 
effect on Load. In both sets of hourly variables, on-peak hours, especially hours 
nine, ten, and seventeen through nineteen, are the most significant and have the 
largest standard errors. This result supports my hypothesis that on-peak hours are 
critical when determining demand because they are the hours in which consumers 
are the most active either at home or at work and they are also the most volatile due 
to changes in temperature, work hours, and other unexpected conditions.   
The results for model (4) indicate the same significant variables as model (3). 
Again, the on peak interactive hourly disaster variables are the most significant in 
representing the effect of the disaster on electricity load. The most significant morning 
on-peak hours are hours deight, dnine, and dten which typically represent the morning 
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spike in load due to the start of the business day. These hours decrease electricity load 
post-disaster by 17.49 percent, 18.22 percent, and 16.16 percent respectively. The most 
significant afternoon on-peak hours are hours dseventeen, deighteen, and dnineteen which 
typically represent the highest demand hours and are followed by significantly lower 
demand. These hours decrease electricity load post-disaster by 18.8 percent, 18. 52 
percent, and 17.89 percent respectively.  
Table 6.  
Variable Comparison Results: Hourly vs. Disaster Hourly Interactive Variables 
 
(Hour) - d(Hour) = 0 Model (3) Model (4) 
Hour F(1, 34994) Prob > F F(1, 34994) Prob > F 
0 310.51 0.000 430.8 0.000 
1 173.29 0.000 253.58 0.000 
2 99.52 0.000 149.62 0.000 
4 49.84 0.000 73.9 0.000 
5 82.2 0.000 120.8 0.000 
6 250.04 0.000 339.66 0.000 
7 613.4 0.000 774.66 0.000 
8 1166.29 0.000 1363.42 0.000 
9 1589.7 0.000 1774.9 0.000 
10 1671.08 0.000 1852.65 0.000 
11 1565.04 0.000 1746.04 0.000 
12 1279.48 0.000 1478.13 0.000 
13 1361.63 0.000 1533.67 0.000 
14 1327.64 0.000 1492.13 0.000 
15 1350.63 0.000 1516.46 0.000 
16 1604.68 0.000 1770.03 0.000 
17 1941.69 0.000 2087.25 0.000 
18 2119.79 0.000 2282.39 0.000 
19 1934.2 0.000 2116.38 0.000 
20 1591.51 0.000 1800.85 0.000 
21 1200.05 0.000 1419.91 0.000 
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22 969.1 0.000 1179.57 0.000 
23 635.8 0.000 820.81 0.000 
 
The results in Table 6 further support my hypothesis by showing that when 
comparing the hourly variables to the interactive hourly disaster variables, the on-peak 
hours are the most significant. Again this result shows that the greatest conservation 
efforts and government regulation occurred between hours seven to twenty. It is also 
important to note that these hours have been targeted in response to a supply shock 
because these hours have the highest demand and therefore have to be closely monitored 
and regulated in order to prevent blackouts. These results support the absence of 
blackouts post-Fukushima and reveal the magnitude of the conservation measures that 
were taken, both by regulation and choice.  Table 6 further displays the significance of 
hours nine and ten as well as hours seventeen through nineteen as holding the greatest 
shifts in demand after the accident. Looking at these results through the lens of the daily 
load curve, it is possible that these hours observed the greatest change post-Fukushima 
because they were the points in the day with the greatest amount of transition. In terms of 
going to and from work, this period marked the time when people could take measures 
such as turning off all of the lights and air conditioning units before heading to work and 
businesses could turn off unused lights and raise internal temperatures at the end of the 
business day. As a result of these seemingly minor changes, large decreases in demand 
can be explained.  
Conclusion:  
 By creating a model to analyze the impact of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
disaster on TEPCO’s electricity load, this paper determined the magnitude of the accident 
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by collecting a large hourly data set and determining an event window that would 
indicate the lasting effect of the disaster on the demand for electricity. This paper 
successfully indicates the magnitude of the Fukushima disaster, both aggregately and 
hourly. Overall, the results reveal that the disaster significantly decreased electricity load. 
The large event window supports this result as it highlights the continuous negative 
impact of the disaster through the end of 2011 and most likely for a long period into the 
future. Given that Model (2) approximates the disaster to have decreased load by almost 
twenty percent for the period, the recovery period for electricity demand to return to pre-
accident levels could take years, and may never return to these levels, especially given 
the declining population and consumer resistance to nuclear energy. These results are 
therefore economically and politically significant given the future uncertainty within the 
Japanese electricity industry. Furthermore, by presenting evidence on the severity of the 
economic impacts of the Tohoku earthquake and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, this 
paper supports the need for changes in preventative measures. A possible solution is to 
expand the country’s supply chain to be dispersed more evenly throughout the country 
and to invest in foreign production facilities in order to limit production setbacks in the 
future.    
While this paper provides a solid platform in terms of analyzing the effects of the 
Fukushima Daiichi disaster on TEPCO’s daily load curve, it may be possible to obtain 
more refined, explanatory results by further dividing the data set. One approach would be 
to divide the service area into coastal and inland regions or regions that are closer to 
Fukushima compared to those farther away. By further refining the regions, a more 
precise impact of the disaster could be detected.  A second method would be to divide the 
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load by industrial sector in order to see which industries observed the most significant 
decreases in electricity, how those decreases affected the industry’s productivity, and for 
how long decreases last and have an impact. This method would also provide more 
refined evidence regarding industries that are severely impacted by the disaster and 
therefore which industries could disperse their suppliers and production in order to 
minimize the economic blow of a disaster.  
Another approach could be to look at disaster-month and disaster-weekday 
interactive variables in order to further determine which months and days observed the 
most significant changes in load post-Fukushima. While my paper indicates that load is 
increasing as we move away from the disaster date (significance and direction of dtrend), 
a closer look into regulated decreases versus consumer chosen decreases in load is 
needed to fully capture the direction in which future load is headed and how these 
changes will affect the daily load curve. By controlling for the fifteen percent decrease in 
electricity demand mandated by the Japanese government, one could quantify the excess 
saving measures being taken, which could lead to a deeper analysis of the lasting demand 
changes taking place in the Tokyo area.  
Although this paper does not differentiate between government mandated load 
reductions and consumer chosen reductions, it does highlight the hours that have seen the 
greatest change in load post-Fukushima. By revealing these hours as the transition 
periods in the daily load curve, future policies can target these hours if additional saving 
measures need to be taken. Utilities can also take advantage of these changes when 
forecasting future electricity demand and signing future supply contracts.  Utilities often 
use different types of energy based on demand, price, and time of day so long term 
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changes in the daily load curve could affect the type of energy policies they use. 
Furthermore, changes in utility operations could affect the prices and policies directed 
towards TEPCO customers. Given the complex relationship between Japanese regulators, 
utilities, and customers it is hard to predict the long-term effect of the supply shock and 
decreased demand that resulted from the Fukushima Daiichi disaster; however, this paper 
provides initial insight into the effects of the disaster.
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Appendix: 
Table 3. 
Models (1) and (2) Regression Results 
 
 
Coefficients 
 
Coefficients 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Load lLoad Variables Load lLoad 
disaster -652.752 -0.192 zero 346.77 0.119 
 
(13.18)** (13.93)** 
 
(84.59)** (106.68)** 
holiday -360.843 -0.105 one 174.364 0.062 
 
(10.93)** (10.74)** 
 
(56.69)** (69.49)** 
Max -9.592 -0.003 two 67.361 0.024 
 
(3.94)** (4.16)** 
 
(30.34)** (38.15)** 
Min 24.938 0.006 four -25.417 -0.01 
 
(6.92)** (6.50)** 
 
(11.88)** (15.63)** 
atrend -19.069 -0.006 five 31.237 0.01 
 
(-1.4) -1.67 
 
(9.56)** (9.83)** 
dtrend 33.592 0.011 six 265.517 0.09 
 
(6.88)** (7.40)** 
 
(44.24)** (49.11)** 
lpopulation -17,596.88 -5.187 seven 571.111 0.186 
 
(2.64)** (2.92)** 
 
(71.76)** (85.58)** 
Sun -489.2 -0.138 eight 922.415 0.287 
 
(24.18)** (25.16)** 
 
(94.19)** (119.22)** 
Mon -65.884 -0.022 nine 1,191.39 0.359 
 
(3.00)** (3.86)** 
 
(104.77)** (137.10)** 
Tue -0.324 -0.001 ten 1,269.96 0.379 
 
(-0.02) (-0.13) 
 
(104.81)** (137.26)** 
Thu 1.302 0.001 eleven 1,280.59 0.381 
 
(-0.07) -0.15 
 
(99.66)** (129.28)** 
Fri -16.177 -0.003 twelve 1,126.78 0.342 
 
(-0.74) (-0.61) 
 
(90.57)** (116.20)** 
Sat -305.573 -0.081 thirteen 1,237.44 0.369 
 
(14.59)** (14.40)** 
 
(92.70)** (117.97)** 
Feb 47.212 0.015 fourteen 1,241.92 0.37 
 
(-1.17) (-1.39) 
 
(90.08)** (114.24)** 
Mar -287.047 -0.074 fifteen 1,225.17 0.366 
 
(7.14)** (6.71)** 
 
(91.71)** (116.34)** 
Apr -597.998 -0.16 sixteen 1,307.97 0.388 
 
(12.62)** (12.31)** 
 
(104.12)** (135.43)** 
May -775.04 -0.213 seventeen 1,378.78 0.408 
 
(13.90)** (13.91)** 
 
(124.52)** (166.46)** 
Jun -629.228 -0.164 eighteen 1,409.55 0.417 
 
(9.64)** (9.31)** 
 
(141.57)** (192.34)** 
Jul -237.756 -0.058 nineteen 1,333.75 0.399 
 
(2.84)** (2.58)** 
 
(142.05)** (188.93)** 
Aug -236.731 -0.061 twenty 1,177.77 0.36 
 
(2.77)** (2.64)** 
 
(133.79)** (173.61)** 
Sep -458.222 -0.119 twentyone 981.552 0.308 
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(6.39)** (6.06)** 
 
(117.89)** (149.20)** 
Oct -757.613 -0.204 twentytwo 850.942 0.272 
 
(13.73)** (13.56)** 
 
(113.30)** (143.22)** 
Nov -521.464 -0.137 twentythree 619.663 0.205 
 
(12.07)** (11.55)** 
 
(92.19)** (114.17)** 
Dec -217.244 -0.053 Constant 331,622.41 104.851 
 
(5.23)** (4.60)** 
 
(2.66)** (3.16)** 
t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 4. 
Models (3) and (4) Regression Results 
 
Coefficients 
 
Coefficients 
  Model 3 Model 4   Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Load lLoad Variables Load  lLoad  
holiday -361.38 -0.105 thirteen 1,367.89 0.405 
  
(10.94)** (10.75)** 
  
(84.16)** (101.81)** 
Max -9.726 -0.003 fourteen 1,372.18 0.405 
  
(4.00)** (4.21)** 
  
(82.02)** (99.29)** 
Min 24.874 0.006 fifteen 1,355.87 0.401 
  
(6.90)** (6.46)** 
  
(83.51)** (101.00)** 
atrend -10.912 -0.003 sixteen 1,443.95 0.424 
  
(-0.81) (-0.9) 
  
(94.23)** (114.72)** 
dtrend 24.4 0.007 seventeen 1,523.62 0.446 
  
(5.40)** (5.62)** 
  
(111.25)** (134.69)** 
lpopulation -9,435.48 -2.41 eighteen 1,553.42 0.455 
  
(-1.54) (-1.46) 
  
(123.08)** (147.61)** 
Sun -489.351 -0.138 nineteen 1,470.54 0.435 
  
(24.25)** (25.18)** 
  
(120.78)** (142.91)** 
Mon -65.931 -0.022 twenty 1,304.50 0.395 
  
(3.01)** (3.86)** 
  
(109.81)** (128.76)** 
Tue -0.336 -0.001 twentyone 1,096.34 0.341 
  
(-0.02) (-0.13) 
  
(93.58)** (109.42)** 
Thu 1.322 0.001 twentytwo 955.228 0.302 
  
(-0.07) (-0.15) 
  
(85.75)** (100.49)** 
Fri -16.613 -0.004 twentythree 713.882 0.233 
  
(-0.76) (-0.64) 
  
(66.97)** (78.74)** 
Sat -305.671 -0.081 dzero -403.066 -0.13 
  
(14.60)** (14.37)** 
  
(10.36)** (11.85)** 
Feb 47.176 0.015 done -368.795 -0.123 
  
(-1.17) (-1.39) 
  
(9.50)** (11.31)** 
Mar -304.939 -0.08 dtwo -333.241 -0.113 
  
(7.55)** (7.17)** 
  
(8.56)** (10.40)** 
Apr -621.433 -0.168 dfour -295.253 -0.101 
  
(13.24)** (13.02)** 
  
(7.61)** (9.34)** 
May -795.231 -0.22 dfive -325.417 -0.11 
  
(14.29)** (14.36)** 
  
(8.44)** (10.27)** 
Jun -646.483 -0.17 dsix -403.411 -0.131 
  
(9.89)** (9.60)** 
  
(10.42)** (11.99)** 
54 
 
Jul -251.757 -0.063 dseven -514.29 -0.157 
  
(2.99)** (2.78)** 
  
(13.30)** (14.41)** 
Aug -248.324 -0.065 deight -615.302 -0.175 
  
(2.89)** (2.80)** 
  
(15.87)** (16.03)** 
Sep -468.173 -0.123 dnine -675.293 -0.182 
  
(6.51)** (6.20)** 
  
(16.93)** (16.32)** 
Oct -766.345 -0.207 dten -692.767 -0.185 
  
(13.86)** (13.72)** 
  
(16.91)** (16.16)** 
Nov -528.967 -0.14 deleven -675.869 -0.18 
  
(12.24)** (11.76)** 
  
(16.06)** (15.37)** 
Dec -223.382 -0.055 dtwelve -641.575 -0.177 
  
(5.37)** (4.76)** 
  
(15.07)** (14.91)** 
zero 428.431 0.146 dthirteen -643.862 -0.173 
  
(45.05)** (53.83)** 
  
(14.81)** (14.31)** 
one 249.082 0.086 dfourteen -642.948 -0.172 
  
(27.48)** (33.12)** 
  
(14.62)** (14.08)** 
two 134.876 0.047 dfifteen -645.12 -0.174 
  
(15.41)** (18.73)** 
  
(14.85)** (14.33)** 
four 34.402 0.011 dsixteen -671.162 -0.179 
  
(3.99)** (4.36)** 
  
(15.87)** (15.12)** 
five 97.168 0.033 dseventeen -714.879 -0.188 
  
(10.72)** (12.25)** 
  
(17.40)** (16.34)** 
six 347.249 0.116 deighteen -710.114 -0.185 
  
(32.50)** (36.91)** 
  
(17.77)** (16.66)** 
seven 675.307 0.218 dnineteen -675.14 -0.179 
  
(56.40)** (65.07)** 
  
(16.94)** (16.11)** 
eight 1,047.08 0.323 dtwenty -625.553 -0.171 
  
(79.40)** (93.59)** 
  
(15.82)** (15.48)** 
nine 1,328.21 0.396 dtwentyone -566.586 -0.161 
  
(92.45)** (111.46)** 
  
(14.46)** (14.65)** 
ten 1,410.32 0.416 dtwentytwo -514.731 -0.15 
  
(94.58)** (114.92)** 
  
(13.30)** (13.78)** 
eleven 1,417.52 0.417 dtwentythree -465.043 -0.142 
  
(90.41)** (110.03)** 
  
(12.11)** (13.13)** 
twelve 1,256.77 0.378 Constant 179,187.07 52.977 
  
(82.16)** (100.05)** 
  
(-1.57) (-1.72) 
t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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